the Senate, which would have to endorse the instrument by a two-thirds majority for the United States to regard itself as bound, and itself fiercely resisted the institutional structure that emerged out of the final negotiations. Clinton did sign the Statute at the end of his term, but acknowledged that the instrument had serious flaws and argued that a signature would allow the United States to participate in a process that corrected its deficiencies. Some also interpreted Clinton's signature as a cynical political act that assigned to his successor the uncomfortable burden of informing the world that the United States could not accept the Statute as written. Similarly, the Clinton Administration: (1) put in place the weapons research and development programmes that led inevitably to the demise of the ABM Treaty; (2) never sought to place the Kyoto Protocol before the Senate, knowing that a bipartisan consensus there adamantly opposed that treaty; (3) oversaw a Senate vote rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; (4) never sought ratification of the Land Mine Convention, knowing of the overwhelming opposition in the Senate; and (5) led a military invasion onto foreign soil without Security Council approval (albeit against Serbia, not Iraq). If one is willing the accept the constitutional system of the United States (that is, an independent Senate's veto power) as an essential characteristic of the nation's involvement in international lawmaking, then one must concede that the problem of US unilateralism is not limited to a single presidential administration. The US failure to go along with the rest of the world reflects a lot more than the outcome of the 2000 election.
This leaves us with the bad character story. I concede the existence of American exceptionalism but identify one widespread misunderstanding about some of its features. I will not defend every aspect of US foreign policy or the state of international law in America. Historical amnesia and a tendency towards robust high spirits explain much about the United States, and it is understandable that many people find these qualities obnoxious. I do want to point out, however, that one of the explanations of US resistance to the International Criminal Court hints at a valuable, if exceptional, contribution to international law.
At the heart of my argument is a claim that the United States, the current Administration included, believes that international law really matters. For the United States, international law is more than a form of discourse -a means of expression that shapes attitudes and expectations without any direct intervention in human affairs. To the contrary, the United States regards breaches of international obligations as serious, leading to imprisonment, payment of damages, the forfeiture of property and, in extreme cases, the loss of national sovereignty. This understanding of international law regards its pronouncements as powerful and terrible -not as gently pressed aspirations. And the logical consequence of this understanding is to shy away from claims about international law that a reasonable person cannot expect to be honoured.
If one accepts that international law is direct and consequential -that the consequence of violation is punishment -then one must pay some attention to the process of making and applying international law. Here, the distinct US commitment to divided government and, fundamentally, to a system of checks and balances comes into play. The US Constitution, both in its original intent and in contemporary understanding, rests on a belief that state power exists in tension with individual liberty. Without an organized state, liberty is extinguished (per Hobbes), but, without restraints on the state, liberty will erode (per Locke). The scheme devised to wrestle with this paradox enlists what are believed to be the natural passions of peopleselfish and short-sighted -to counterpose groups and interests so as to prevent any one from attaining excessive power.
Working within this constitutionally framed perspective, an American will look at any exercises of substantial authority and ask where the institutional checks are. An American can accept unwritten understandings based on history and common premises as an effective institutional check -we take inspiration from the British Constitution, for example. By the same token, empty formalism does not wash -few of us accepted the validity of Soviet elections during the era when opposition to the Communist Party constituted a criminal offense. The basic point remains: if one cannot find genuine and regularized checks on the exercise of state power, an American is constitutionally inclined to suspect that despotism looms.
One might take issue with American insistence on checks and balances. The assumption that public actors behave opportunistically strikes some as degrading and false, and the erection of barriers to the exercise of power necessarily means that some good and useful actions will not take place. I will not try to defend here the American attitude towards divided rule, but only offer it as an irreducible characteristic of the country.
What does this have to do with US unilateralism? An American will believe that if a permanent International Criminal Court is to have meaningful powers, then one must consider how to impose substantial checks on its authority. The potential problems that an unrestrained judiciary can pose -problems all too familiar to those who live with the US courts -include hubris, self-enlargement of jurisdiction and the substitution of social policymaking for the considered decision of specific cases. The design of the institution must take these concerns into account.
From this perspective, the Rome Statute has two serious flaws. First, only admonitions restrain the discretion of the Prosecutor and the Court. If conscientious people occupy these posts, then the mandate not to proceed in cases where a state, in good faith, prosecutes misconduct by its agents will work. But good faith is a very flexible concept. Self-aggrandizing prosecutors and judges are not unheard of, even in human rights cases. Success as a prosecutor or judge is a great foundation for a future political career, and success in our world is measured more by popularity than by reaching the just result. The question is not whether the current personnel of the ICC pose this risk, but whether it is right to insist upon some reservation of control over the Court's prosecutorial discretion.
Because the ICC is a creature of the UN, the only duly constituted lawmaker capable of supervising the Court is the Security Council, which can act only when the five veto-wielding Permanent Members are unanimous. The present Statute allows the Security Council to override the ICC's prosecutorial discretion only when the five permanent members agree to do so. All prior international criminal tribunals have had their jurisdiction established by positive acts of the Security Council (in the case of Nfiremberg, by agreement of the states that became the Permanent Members). The United States desired to retain this jurisdictional structure for the ICC.
The objection to basing jurisdiction on case-by-case Security Council determinations is that this procedure enables each of the Permanent Members to immunize itself and its allies. This argument, however, is deeply inconsistent with the premise that underlies the Security Council structure. Under what circumstances would the ICC proceed against a Permanent Member? The Permanent Members' veto right reflects an assumption about their great power status, backed up in each case by the possession of an overt nuclear capacity. What kind of tribunal will seek to haul a great power into the dock? The United States is asked to take it on faith that the ICC would develop a culture of appropriate self-restraint and modest ambition. But the constitutional skepticism of unchecked power, characteristic of American attitudes, will not admit such a leap into the unknown.
Let us suppose, alternatively, that no one expects the ICC to proceed against a great power, including the United States. Then why give it this authority? The Court's failure to consider misconduct by the Permanent Members can only undermine its credibility and diminish the strength of its deterrent. This, I think, is a particularly American point of view -to believe that unrealistic idealism is corrosive, not admirable.
The second flaw in the Rome Statute is the open-ended quality of its substantive mandate.
2 Even putting aside the question of future crime definition, implicated in the imbroglio over criminalizing aggression, one must concede that the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute bristle with unanswered questions about the scope of prohibited conduct, the availability of defenses and excuses, and the openness of the terminology to expansive and innovative interpretation. Endowing the ICC with such significant lawmaking power, again subject only to after-the-fact Security Council repudiation, requires enormous trust in the persons who will serve in that institution. The United States is not crazy to seek better constraints on the substantive limits of the ICC's jurisdiction. I will deal only briefly with two other counts in the indictment of US unilateralism -the use of military tribunals to deal with suspected international terrorists and resistance to judicial creation of a federal common law of international human rights -made by contributors to this issue. First, what interests me about attacks on the tribunals is how often they rely on assumptions of bad faith in future choices by the US Executive. Exactly the trust in wise exercise of prosecutorial discretion that proponents of the ICC seem to take for granted regarding that institution disappears when it comes to the military tribunals. I will not deny for a second that these tribunals can be abused. I worry especially about cases where the Justice Department initiates a criminal prosecution in the regular courts and then seeks to transfer the case to military jurisdiction. These are exactly the instances where our courts have the capacity, constitutional authority and, it appears, inclination to intervene. Secondly, resistance to the expansion of the power of domestic courts to decide what constitutes a violation of customary international law does not necessarily amount to a rejection of international obligations. The United States has a unique civil liability system, with its m6lange of contingency fees for plaintiffs' attorneys, generous class action procedures, far-reaching pre-trial discovery and open-ended conceptions of compensable damages. These features give plaintiffs an advantage that no other legal system in the world matches, and have provoked incomprehension and criticism on the part of many foreign jurists. It is exactly because civil litigation is such a powerful tool that people in the United States seek to impose some limits on the process. The conventional move is to ask the federal courts, which lack the common-law powers of the state courts, to respect legislative mandates in cases that do not involve the interpretation of the Constitution.
Congress, in 1991, enacted the Torture Victims Protection Act, to provide a right to civil relief for victims of state-sanctioned torture and murder. 5 The claim that Section
Nine of the 1789 Judiciary Act already does this and much more besides has been deeply controversial since 1980 -the first time that any US court suggested this interpretation. 6 Now that creative lawyers have invoked Section Nine to bring class action suits against large corporations, rather than individual claims against the stray dictator or thug, many in the US legal community are asking whether that obscure statute possibly can mean what these lawyers and a few lower courts say it means.
7
The ultimate answer will come from the Supreme Court, which already has hinted at doubts about allowing Section Nine to serve as a basis for civil suits based on To return to my general theme, none of these instances represents a repudiation of the struggle to strengthen human rights, but rather an appreciation that good process and concern for institutional design are essential parts of that struggle. Some of the most savage regimes of the twentieth century cloaked their crimes with justifications that invoked higher-order goals of human fulfillment. What the United States is telling the international community, I believe, is that, as the enterprise of international law becomes greater and more meaningful, we need to devote attention to means, not just ends. 
